Two Ethical Styles: The Debate About Gender (page 2)

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Carol Gilligan's "feminine" ethic of care

Harvard psychologist Carol Gilligan studied Kohlberg's findings and found them wanting. Because all Kohlberg's subjects were male, Kohlberg could not have taken into account the different socialization of little girls and little boys in our culture. Males are traditionally socialized to be autonomous and independent, while females are supposed to be passive but loving caretakers for the members of their group. Gilligan argues that these differences lead to different values. She writes,

For the men, this had led to a morality based on equal rights and devotion to abstract principles even at the sacrifice of people's well-being. For the women, it had led to a morality based on caring, in which increasing maturity broadened the scope of the person's sense of responsibility and compassion. For mature women, the goal became not equality but equity, in responding to people's differing needs. Gilligan's subsequent research suggests that Kohlberg missed an alternate way of thinking about right and wrong, an approach used by both men and women, but used far more frequently by women. In this outlook, care and responsibility to others, rather than justice and individual rights become the fundamental ethical principles. Gilligan claims that this ethical outlook defines an ethical issue mainly in terms of helping others and minimizing harm. The most basic moral command becomes "an injunction to care, a responsibility to discern and alleviate the `real and recognizable trouble' of this world." If ethics is essentially a matter of getting involved with other people's lives in order to reduce their troubles, then, we have a responsibility to help others. Thus in the view of most women, she says, "the moral person is one who helps others; goodness is service, meeting one's obligations and responsibilities to others."

From this ethical perspective, every situation is different, and appropriate responses will vary from case to case, depending on the details. Every problem, then, calls for a tailor-made solution, not something "off the rack." In fact, Gilligan's "care" outlook is often called a "response" orientation.

Stages of development

Like Kohlberg, Gilligan thinks that people develop through a series of stages on their way to "moral maturity" (although the stages are less central to her thought than to Kohlberg's and are given much briefer treatment). Whereas Kohlberg's stages involve a progressively more abstract way of thinking about ethics, however, Gilligan describes stages that involve a woman's developing an advanced sense of responsibility.

The first stage is characterized by caring only for the self in order to ensure survival. This is how we all are as children. Then comes a transitional phase when others criticize this attitude as selfish and the individual begins to see connections between herself and others. The second stage is characterized by a sense of responsibility. "Good" is equated with caring for others, a value readily captured in the traditional role of wife and mother. Such devotion to caring for other people often leads to ignoring the self, however, and this ultimately gives way to a second transition in which the tensions between the responsibility of caring for others and the desire to have one's own needs met are faced. Finally the third stage is defined by an acceptance of the principle of care as a universal ethical principle which schemes exploitation and hurt in the lives of others and ourselves.

The ethics of justice and the ethics of care compared

Justice, care, and the case of Roger and Hal

According to Gilligan, men and women look at ethical situations through different "lenses," with each one revealing something different. Suppose we look again at the case of Roger's and Hal's sick days first through one lense, then through the other. As you will see, the problem underlying the case looks entirely different, depending on which one we use.

Through Kohlberg's "justice" lense, we see a problem of fairness. The policy is explicit, and it has served the interests of the company and the workers very well. The ethical problem is obviously whether we should treat Roger and Hal the same or treat them differently.

We all feel sorry for Roger, but the rules are clear and they have to apply the same to everyone. We might want to treat Roger differently than Hal, but how can we? That wouldn't be fair to Hal. And according to Kohlberg's hierarchy, acting according to an abstract principle of fairness--the requirement that we treat similar cases the same way--is ethically superior to giving in to our personal sympathy towards Roger. We must apply the rules consistently.

What if we gave both men another chance? That would hardly be fair to people who were fired in the past for exceeding 12 sick days. Nor would it be fair to the other employees, many of whom may want or need to take extra sick days but don't. Perhaps they have a problem with some other policy. If we make this exception for Roger, aren't we setting a dangerous precedent and opening a Pandora's box? Wouldn't everybody now expect special treatment? Without a policy, decisions could end up being arbitrary, and we cannot do business in a way that meets everyone's interests if we make exceptions all the time. That would be chaos

When we view the case in this way, we are hard pressed to defend treating the two men differently from each other or from the way the policy clearly specifies. Anything other than identical treatment appears unjust, unfair, and sure to cause more problems than it solves.

Through a "care" lense, however, the problem looks quite different. Now it seems to involve our responsibility to help someone in need. Given this assumption, treating Hal and Roger the same seems indefensible. If the facts we have are correct and complete, clearly Roger and his son need help more than Hal does. Making some special arrangements for Roger will not hurt others in the company--and may, in fact, reassure them that the company will help them too should they find themselves with a serious problem on their hands. If we do not assist Roger with this unusual and difficult problem, we will have violated the principle of care.

The question is no longer "do we apply or ignore the policy?" From a "care" point of view, policies are for normal cases, not unusual ones. Because this is an unusual case, the primary question, then, is, "What is ethically appropriate to these special circumstances?" From this perspective, special treatment for Roger is not "setting a precedent." It is not going to come back to haunt us, as the "justice" outlook would have it. Making an exception to policy this time does not mean that we would do so in every case. Nor would such an exception constitute arbitrariness. We are trying "to discern and alleviate the `real and recognizable trouble' of this world." To find a solution tailor-made to a special circumstance, we must be guided by the facts of each case.

With all this in mind, we can perhaps say that treating Hal and Roger the same is not "fair." The essence of fairness is treating similar cases the same. But these two employees are in very different situations. Circumstances are beyond Roger's control--not so Hal's. Roger's problem is real and serious. He also has a better work history with the company. The two cases differ so much that in fact it may be unfair to treat them the same.

From which perspective would you view the case of Roger and Hal if it were yours to decide. Look back at the results of that short self-inventory you took a few pages ago. The odds are that if you have a high "J" score, you probably think Roger and Hal should be treated the same. If you have a high "C" score, you probably think it would be wrong not to give Roger special treatment.

Similarities and differences

Gilligan's model of moral development resembles Kohlberg's in a couple of ways. Both progress from a totally self-centered outlook to one governed by a central moral principle. Both begin with an emphasis on the greater authority or importance of someone else, but culminate in a personal forging of one's own ethics.

The differences between these two approaches, however, are more striking than the similarities. For one thing, the moral principles arrived at are very different. Treating people impartially according to abstract principles of justice is more detached and less personal than reducing the amount of pain and suffering in the world. Although both values are important, "respecting someone's rights" affects the lives of ordinary people less immediately than "reducing their sorrow and unhappiness."

More notably, perhaps, Gilligan's findings speak to the psychological struggle of women against our society's traditional idea of their gender-determined role. According to Gilligan, women can gain personal independence and autonomy only after they reject the idea that their proper role is to subjugate their interests to those of their husbands, children, or other people they are caring for. A typical woman in our culture probably has no trouble accepting the idea that helping others is important. The harder task is accepting the idea that she should apply the principle of care to her own life as much as she applies it to others. Kohlberg's stages reflect no such psychological struggle for men.

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