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3. Deontological (act oriented) ethics

The second major tradition in philosophical ethics is a deontological approach. This outlook is based on the idea that teleological thinkers flatly deny--that actions have intrinsic moral value. Some actions are considered inherently good (truth-telling, keeping promises, respecting the rights of others); others are bad (dishonesty, coercion, theft, manipulation). No matter how much good comes from lying, argues a deontological thinker, the action will never be right.

a. Immanuel Kant: a universal moral law

Philosophy's most representative deontological thinker is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant believed that he had discovered the fundamental moral law that would determine the ethical character of an action without regard to its consequences. Kant called his moral law the categorical imperative--a command that holds no matter what the circumstances. He believed further that the validity of this ethical principle stemmed from reason itself and from our nature as free, rational moral agents with inherent value.

Even more so than we saw above with Aristotle, Kant assesses the moral character of actions by focusing on the internal, particularly the rational aspect of human conduct. Kant sees the validity of his ethics as being so steeped in reason that commentators have noted that his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals could have been called Ethics Based on Reason. Kant notes that the basis of moral obligation "must not be sought in the nature of man or in the circumstances in which he is placed, but sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason."

For an action to be good, Kant believes that it must not simply conform to a moral law, but be done for the sake of a moral law. Indeed, Kant claims that the only thing inherently good is a good will, that is, one that follows reason's guidance and acts from a sense of duty. A good will chooses what it does simply and purely because it is the right thing to do, not because it is inclined to do some deed nor because it has positive consequences. Moreover, Kant claims that reason dictates that the principle according to which one is willing, what Kant terms an action's "maxim," should be able to be a universal law. As Kant expresses it in his first formulation of the categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law of nature."

Kant's initial formulation of the categorical imperative reflects the belief that since ethics is essentially a rational enterprise, ethical principles should have the same character as such rational activities as logic and mathematics. For example, they should be internally consistent and universally valid. Kant argues that if one can will the maxim of one's action as a universal law, the principle on which one's deed is based meets these requirements and thereby conforms to a sense of duty. Maxims which fail this test are, by contrast, self-defeating and contradictory. Kant illustrates this with the example of a false promise. He writes,

[A] man finds himself forced by need to borrow money. He well knows that he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that nothing will be loaned him if he does not firmly promise to repay it at a certain time. He desires to make such a promise, but he has enough conscience to ask himself whether it is not improper and opposed to duty to relieve his distress in such a way. Now, assuming he does decide to do so, the maxim of his action would be as follows: When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know I shall never do so. Now this principle of self-love or of his own benefit may very well be compatible with his whole future welfare, but the question is whether it is right. He changes the pretension of self-love into a universal law and then puts the question: How would it be if my maxim became a universal law? He immediately sees that it could never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself; rather it must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law which says that anyone who believes himself to be in need could promise what he pleased with the intention of not fulfilling it would make the promise itself and the end to be accomplished by it impossible; no one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any such assertion as vain pretense. The false promise, then, is morally wrong because the maxim on which it is based is internally inconsistent. Universalizing it destroys the very concept of a promise which it aims to use. Such a principle of volition is illogical. The behavior of anyone who follows such a principle is morally flawed because it is literally irrational.

Kant's initial account of the moral law focuses on our rational nature, but later in the Foundations he defines the categorical imperative in terms of human dignity and freedom. He writes: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means." Kant believes that we have a dignity that must be respected in our dealings with each other. Treating people as "ends" requires seeing them as autonomous beings who are entitled to control their own fate and not to be deceived or manipulated. Actions which are consistent with the dignity and autonomy of moral agents are intrinsically good. Treating people simply as a "means," however, is to regard them as something that we use for our own purposes without their full and free consent. Such actions are thus inherently wrong.

Kant returns to the issue of the false promise to illustrate this idea:

[A] man in need finds himself forced to borrow money. He knows well that he won't be able to repay it, but he sees also that he will not get any loan unless he firmly promises to repay it within a fixed time. He wants to make such a promise, but he still has conscience enough to ask himself whether it is not permissible and is contrary to duty to get out of difficulty in this way. . .. [He] will immediately see that he intends to make use of another man merely as a means to an end which the latter does not likewise hold. For the man whom I want to use for my own purposes by such a promise cannot possibly concur with my way of action toward him and hence cannot himself hold the end of this action. The person who was deceived by the false promise was tricked into doing something that he or she would not have consented to had all the facts been known. Even if the debt is ultimately paid, it does not change the fact that one person imposed his will on another and treated him simply as a means to an end. Moral agents, for Kant, are free and autonomous. Being used against our will simply as a means to someone else's end violates this freedom.

Kant's discussions of the categorical imperative reveal the heart of a deontological outlook, but the details of his philosophy are complex. A less technical way of describing a deontological approach, however, might be to say that the ultimate ethical standard is whether an action fits with, is consistent with or is appropriate to the fact that it is done to or performed by a being of a special sort--one that is rational and free. Indeed, this is the basic premise of claims that humans have rights. To say that we have basic human rights is to claim that we are entitled to treatment of a certain sort simply because of the very fabric of our being. That is why these rights are sometimes spoken of as "inalienable." They reflect characteristic and defining features of our nature. Legal rights are created and bestowed by governments, but fundamental moral rights inhere in our nature and are simply recognized, not granted by countries. A deontological approach to ethics, then, sees rights to fairness, equality, justice, honesty, and the respect of our dignity as rooted in the fundamental characteristics that define our nature.

Like a teleological approach to ethics, a deontological outlook has much to commend it. Analyzing an ethical dilemma takes on a much narrower focus than when approached teleologically. The only question is: Which actions are inherently good? Instead of engaging in complex projections of the primary and secondary consequences of some act, we focus simply on the deed itself. Does it respect the basic human rights of everyone involved? Does it avoid deception, coercion and manipulation? Does it treat people equally and fairly?

The primary difficulty with this approach, however, is its inflexibility. If lying is intrinsically wrong, there is no way to justify it even when it produces more good than harm. If we lie or steal in order to help someone, for example, a deontological approach still condemns it. And this total lack of compromise makes a deontological standard a difficult one to live by.

4. Evaluating the moral character of actions

Between teleological and deontological approaches to ethics, then, we see the basic elements that can be used in determining the ethical character of actions. One school of thought points to the results, the other to the actions themselves. So between them they reveal a wide array of internal and external factors of human action that have moral consequence. While these two outlooks conflict in theory, they complement one another in practice. In the pragmatic challenge of identifying and resolving ethical dilemmas, then, neither should be ignored; each acts as a check on the limitations of the other.

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